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DESIGN DEFECTS: ARE CONSUMER
EXPECTATIONS UNREALISTIC?
In LeRay v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,' the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's request that the jury be
instructed to decide a design defect case on the basis of the risk-utility
balancing test. 2 Under the risk-utility balancing test, a product is de-
fectively designed only if the risks that it creates outweigh its utility to
society.' Therefore, a product that presents substantial risks to consumers
will not be defective if its utility is sufficiently high. 4 The strict liability
risk-utility balancing test is similar to a negligence balancing test5 in
that the fact-finder must weigh considerations of social utility in deciding
whether a product is defective. 6 The major distinction between the doc-
trine of strict liability and that of negligence is that the defendant's use
of reasonable care or his inability to know or prevent the risks created
by the product is not a defense in a strict liability case, whereas, these
defenses can be used to preclude a finding of negligence. 7 The strict
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. 444 So. 2d 1252 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
2. In LeRay, an umbrella filter was inserted in the plaintiff's inferior vena cava to
stop the migration of blood clots to the plaintiff's lungs. The filter dislodged from the
vena cava and migrated to the right lung, lodging in the plaintiff's right pulmonary artery.
As a result, the plaintiff suffered severe brain damage and sued the manufacturer of the
filtering device, Edwards Labs, aleging that the filter was defectively designed. The jury
found for the plaintiff and the first circuit, using the consumer-expectation test, affirmed
the decision.
3. See 5 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability, 679, 689 app. (1984); Hunt
v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d 585, 588-89 (La. 1980).
4. 5 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, supra note 3, at 679, 689 (app.).
5. Professor Wade has advanced a list of factors that should be weighed against
one another to determine whether a product is defectively designed:
1) the usefulness of the product;
2) the likelihood and probable seriousness of injury from the product;
3) the availability of a safer substitute;
4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing
the product's usefulness;
5) the user's ability to avoid the danger through the use of due care;
6) the common knowledge and expectations as to the danger the product
presents; and
7) the feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the risk through
increased prices. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
6. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983).
7. Hunt v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d 585, 588 (La. 1980).
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liability action focuses on the condition of the product rather than the
conduct of the manufacturer!
After rejecting the balancing test, the court applied the consumer-
expectation test to determine whether a product is defectively designed.9
Under the consumer-expectation test, a product is defective if it is
dangerous beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary
consumer.'" This writer submits that the balancing test is the proper stan-
dard to be used in a design defect case, and that the LeRay court applied
the wrong standard.
The doctrine of strict products liability has become an important
tool in helping injured consumers state a cause of action against a
manufacturer that cannot be found negligent." Strict liability is said to
have been developed to alleviate the sometimes impossible problem of
proving the manufacturer's negligence.' 2 It is important to remember
that a defendant cannot allege due care as a defense to a strict liability
action because he is presumed to have knowledge of the product's
dangerous condition. 3 Some policy reasons for this development are:
(1) the mahufacturer is in the best position to discover any defect; (2)
strict liability forces a manufacturer to improve his product and keep
abreast of all the latest equipment and industry standards; and (3) the
manufacturer is usually in the best position to spread the loss through
price increases and insurance.' 4 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can
help a plaintiff when specific negligence on the part of the defendant
is impossible to discover, but res ipsa loquitur requires a logical inference
from all the evidence that the defendant was negligent. Therefore, the
accident must be one that ordinarily would not occur in the absence of
negligence. 5 The doctrine of strict liability gives a plaintiff more pro-
tection against a manufacturer than the traditional notions of negligence
8. Id. at 588; see also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432-34, 573 P.2d
443, 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238-39 (1978).
9. 444 So. 2d at 1255.
10. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment (i); see also W. Keeton & W.
Prosser, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 690, 698 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
11. Wade, supra note 5, at 826.
12. Prosser, supra note 10, at 692; see also Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the
Manufacturer is Negligence, 49 Va. L. Rev. 675, 676 (1963).
13. The major difference between strict liability and negligence is that scienter is
imputed to the defendant in strict liability actions. The question then becomes whether
or not the defendant was reasonable in placing the product on the market assuming he
knew of its dangerous condition. See Wade, supra note 5, at 834-35; Kent v. Gulf States
Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 501 (La. 1982).
14. For a general discussion of the policy reasons behind the development of strict
liability, see Prosser, supra note 10, at 692-94. See also Green, Strict Liability Under
Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 1189; Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
15. Prosser, supra note 10, at 242-48.
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and res ipsa loquitur because strict liability does not require the plaintiff
to prove or even infer negligence. 16
The Louisiana products liability action is based on the holding in
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.: 17
A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury
to the user is liable to any person, whether the purchaser or a
third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury
caused by a defect in design, composition, or manufacture of
the article. However, the plaintiff claiming injury has the burden
of proving that the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably
dangerous to normal use, and that the plaintiff's injuries were
caused by reason of the defect.' 8
The Louisiana cause of action is similar to both products liability actions
in common law states 9 and to the approach taken in section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2"
Proving that a product is defectively designed is different from proving
that a product was defectively manufactured and usually more difficult
for a jury to understand. A manufacturing defect can be seen easily by
comparison to products without defects. The manufacturer did not make
what he intended to make nor did the consumer get what he thought
he was getting, (e.g.) a soft drink bottle with a chip in it would possess
a manufacturing defect because the manufacturer did not intend to make
a chipped bottle.2 In a design defect case spotting the defect is difficult
because there is nothing specifically wrong or different about the injuring
product that distinguishes it from the others. The manufacturer produced
and sold exactly what he intended to sell in that he made a conscious
choice in designing the product in a certain fashion. When the plaintiff
is injured and sues the manufacturer, he alleges that the product was
defective because it should have been designed in a safer manner. 22 It
is clear that the role of the fact-finder in deciding what is defective is
more difficult in the design area than it is in the manufacturing area.
In deciding what is wrong with the product, the fact-finder has nothing
with which to compare it. Therefore, determining whether a product is
16. Wade, supra note 5, at 826.
17. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
18. Id. at 602-03, 250 So. 2d at 755 (emphasis added).
19. Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d 816, 819 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
20. The pertinent part of § 402A states:
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer .... (2) although (a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product. See
also Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
21. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 695-97.
22. Id. at 698-99; see also Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 559 (1969).
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defectively designed entails closely scrutinizing basic social policies to
decide what standards and safety precautions society should require of
a manufacturer before he is allowed to market a product to the public.
Relying on DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.23 and
Hebert v. Brazzel,2 4 the LeRay court declined to use the risk-utility
balancing approach to decide a design defect case. The court defined
a "defective or unreasonably dangerous product as one that is dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary
consumer." 25 The court went on to say, "This shift to a consumer
expectation approach for determining defectiveness impliedly rejects the
prior balancing test of Hunt v. City Stores.' '2 6 However, a closer look
at DeBattista and Hebert will disclose that these two cases not only are
distinguishable from LeRay but also are inconsistent with other Louisiana
cases that have adhered to the balancing approach. 27 Just as in other
states, 28 the balancing approach is still the proper method for analyzing
design defect cases in Louisiana.
In DeBattista a blood bank was held strictly liable when the plaintiff
contracted serum hepatitis from a blood transfusion that he received
while undergoing surgery. The court found the blood defective, i.e.,
unreasonably dangerous in normal use. The court stated, "The risks
involved in receiving a transfusion of blood in this condition are certainly
greater than a reasonable consumer would expect." ' 29 The court refused
the defendant's request that the jury be instructed to use the risk-utility
balancing test to determine whether the blood was defective. The court
discounted the risk-utility test as a misconstruction of the unreasonably-
dangerous standard, stating that .'[u]nreasonably dangerous' means sim-
ply that the article which injured the plaintiff was dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary con-
sumer." 30 If DeBattista is regarded as having discarded the balancing
test in design defect cases altogether, then lower courts will have been
given nothing but ambiguous reasoning to assist them in deciding the
23. 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
24. 403 So. 2d 1242 (La. 1981).
25. 444 So. 2d at 1255.
26. Id. In DeBattista, Justice Dennis explains that Louisiana retains the motion of
unreasonable risk in a strict liability action. If this is so, it is necessary to conclude that
the only way to determine "unreasonableness" is by using the balancing process just as
in negligence cases except that the defendant is imputed with knowledge of the defect.
403 So. 2d at 31.
27. See Hunt v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980); Juneau v. Interstate Blood
Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 220 (La. 1976);
Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 352 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978).
28. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
29. 403 So. 2d at 31.
30. Id. at 30.
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meaning of "unreasonably dangerous." 3 The important considerations
involved are simply too complex to justify a single all-purpose definition
of "defect" in the design context. The consumer-expectation test is
inadequate by itself to give courts or juries any guidelines to follow in
determining whether a product's design is safe enough to meet the
requirements which society imposes on manufacturers before they market
a product. Jurors have been conditioned by advertising and governmental
regulatory agencies to expect perfection in the market place. Such ex-
pectations have been raised to an unreasonably high level. If the ex-
pectations of a consumer (even the mythical prudent consumer) are the
sole criteria used by the fact-finder in deciding design cases, many useful
products may never reach the market. Practicality demands that the
fact-finder be allowed to weigh the risks of a product against its utility
before deciding the issue of liability. Otherwise, because of high consumer
expectations, strict products liability will become absolute liability, mak-
ing a manufacturer virtually an insurer of his product. Using the con-
sumer-expectation test alone, it is easy to look back on the injury on
the one hand and say that a reasonable consumer who is ill may expect
that he could be infected with hepatitis from a transfusion if medical
technology has no foolproof way to discover hepatitis in blood. A
reasonable consumer in such a position would most probably be willing
to take the risk and accept the transfusion, since the blood may be
vital to the cure. It seems logical that if one wants to decide what a
reasonable consumer might expect from a certain product, one must
weigh the risks of the product against its utility in society. For example,
the jury could conclude that a reasonable consumer might expect that
a product such as blood has such a high utility that the risk of contracting
hepatitis, absent any negligence, does not make the product unreasonably
dangerous. Therefore, what the ordinary consumer expects may be im-
portant in deciding whether or not a product is unreasonably dangerous,
but this does not mean that the balancing approach should be discarded.3 2
31. See Note, DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.: The Meaning of
Unreasonably Dangerous in Louisiana Products Liability, 42 La. L. Rev. 1453 (1982).
The author of this Note criticizes DeBattista by examining the problems California courts
experienced when they refused to adhere to the balancing test in design cases. The ambiguity
that the lower courts had to deal with when trying to decide whether a product was
defective eventually caused California to return to the balancing test. See also Justice
Blanch's dissent in DeBattista where he indicated that the test used by the majority makes
the blood bank an insurer of its product even though there are no ways for science to
detect hepatitis in blood units at all times. 403 So. 2d at 34.
32. The landmark case of Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d. 413, 573 P.2d 443,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), advocates the use of the consumer expectations test in the
alternative with the risk-utility balancing approach. In any case, the Louisiana Legislature
has eliminated strict liability for blood transfusions. See 1981 La. Acts, No. 331, adding
La. R.S. 9:2797; 1981 La. Acts, No. 611, adding La. Civ. Code art. 2322.
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In Hebert, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a valve in strict
liability for injuries when the valve blew off of a pressurized water tank
and struck him in the chest. The handwheel used to release the pressure
to the valve was broken off, so the plaintiff used a wrench to turn the
valve stem, the stem broke off, and pressure was released too rapidly,
causing the accident. Whether the valve stem was broken by its being
forced with the wrench or in some other manner was not clear, but
using the consumer-expectation test, the jury found that the valve was
not defectively designed or manufactured. 3 The Louisiana Supreme Court
decided that the jury's factual determinations were not erroneous. The
jury also found that the plaintiff's decedent had assumed the risk and
misused the product with the wrench. Misuse is a defense in a design
defect case as well as in a manufacturing defect case.34 Nowhere in the
opinion did Justice Dennis expressly reject the balancing approach for
design cases. Therefore, it is submitted that the Hebert court simply
did not want to disturb the jury's factual finding that plaintiff's decedent
misused the product. This use of the consumer-expectation test does not
mean that Louisiana courts reject the balancing process in design cases.
Strict liability under Civil Code article 231735 is similar to strict
liability for a design defect in products liability cases.36 Under article
2317, the custodian of a thing is strictly liable if the thing poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to others in light of all relevant social,
economic, and moral considerations.3 7 The relevant principle was es-
poused in the case of Loescher v. Parr:
When harm results from the conduct or defect of a person or
thing which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, a
person legally responsible under these code articles for the su-
pervision, care, or guardianship of the person or thing may be
held liable for the damage thus caused, despite the fact that no
personal negligent act or inattention on the former's part is
proved. The liability arises from his legal relationship to the
person or thing whose conduct or defect creates an unreasonable
risk of injuries to others.38
Similarly, the manufacturer of a product is strictly liable for the defective
design if the product is unreasonably dangerous in normal use. 9 The
33. 403 So. 2d at 1245.
34. Id.
35. Civil Code article 2317 provides: "[W]e are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom
we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody."
36. See Kent v. Gulf States, 418 So. 2d at 49 n.6; see also DeBattista, 403 So. 2d
at 30.
37. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (La. 1983).
38. 324 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. 1976).
39. 259 La. at 599, 250 So. 2d at 754.
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unreasonable-risk-of-harm criterion of article 2317 cannot be distinguished
from the unreasonably-dangerous-in-normal-use standard used in products
liability cases. Hence a product that is unreasonably dangerous in normal
use would pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Reasonable care
is not a defense in strict liability under article 23170 or in a design case,
yet both theories of liability involve a value judgment as to what society
considers "unreasonable" for the manufacturer or custodian of a thing
to release upon the public. Therefore, the standard for determining liability
under 2317 and in design cases should be the same.
It can be seen from Entrevia v. Hoodthat the risk-utility balancing
process is still used in article 2317 actions. The issue in Entrevia was
whether the owner of a remote, unoccupied farmhouse, which was sur-
rounded by a fence and posted with "no trespassing" signs is strictly liable
for damages to a trespasser injured by the colapse of the building's steps.
The trial court determined that there was no unreasonble risk of harm
to Entrevia posed "by the steps of a remote farmhouse that had "no
trespassing" signs posted .. ."'I The court of appeal reversed, award-
ing the plaintiff damages, holding that the defendant was liable since the
plaintiff had proved that the defendant's defective steps had caused plain-
tiff's injuries and that the defendant had proved no affirmative defense.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the deci-
sion of the trial court, stating that the mere fact that plaintiff was hurt
by the colapse of the steps was not enough for recovery under article
2317 or article 2322. The plaintiff must prove that her injuries were caus-
ed by a quality of the building that posed an unreasonable risk of harm
to others.' 3 The court decided correctly that it is not the fact of the in-
jury that gives rise to strict liability but that the injury was caused by
an unreasonable risk created by a thing in the defendant's custody. The
unreasonable risk is determined without looking at the conduct of the
manufacturer but by focusing strictly on the product and using the risk-
utility balancing approach:
As this court has noted in relation to other forms of strict
liability under the civil code, the activities of a man for which
he may be liable without acting negligently are to be determined
after a study of the laws and customs, a balancing of claims
and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of the
40. Once the plaintiff proves the product poses an "unreasonable risk of harm," the
defendant has only three defenses to a 2317 action: "fault of the victim, fault of a third
person, or an irresistible force." See Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1148.
41. 427 So. 2d 1146 (1983).
42. Id. at 1147.
43. Id. at 1149.
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harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights and
obligations."
The court agreed with the trial court that to force all owners to repair
broken steps in remote farmhouses would be too costly since the steps
posed a minimal risk. This type of balancing test is constantly used by
judges in negligence cases. 4 The policy considerations are the same under
article 2317, the only difference being that the defendant is presumed
to possess knowledge of the defect. The court analyzes a 2317 liability
situation by first assuming the defendant knew of the defect, then
deciding whether the defendant was acting as a reasonable man by
maintaining the thing. 46 Therefore, since the liability of the custodian
of a thing under article 2317 is similar to the liability of the manufacturer
of a defectively designed product, the risk-utility balancing approach
used to determine an unreasonable risk of harm under article 2317 is
relevant to the treatment of strict liability for a conscious design case.
Logic dictates that if Entrevia retains the balancing approach in the
article 2317 area, the balancing approach must also be retained in design
cases.
Louisiana products liability law has been influenced by the common
law of other states, 47 many of which use section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as the basis for a strict liability action. 48 The unrea-
sonably dangerous standard set out by section 402A 49 to determine design
defects is very similar to the Weber standard of unreasonably dangerous
in normal use employed in Louisiana. Both standards require that the
product be defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer. Despite the fact that section 402A defines unreasonably dangerous
as "dangerous beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics, ' 5 0 many states which use section
402A as a premise for strict liability in conscious design cases still use
the risk-utility balancing approach.5 The leading case in the common
law jurisdictions in this area is Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.12
in which the Supreme Court of California reversed a lower court decision
that held the jury was not to be permitted to consider the risk-utility
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1150.
46. Id.
47. See Guilyot, 362 So. 2d at 819; see also Kent, 418 So. 2d aft 501.
48. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
49. See supra note 20.
50. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment (i).
51. See Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1975); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Bowman v. General
Motors, 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065 (Ariz.
1976); Garst v. General Motors, 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971).
52. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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factor in reaching its determination. The court decided that the consumer-
expectation test can be used in a design case, but not alone. The jury
must also be instructed as to the risk-utility balancing test before they
decide the issue of defectiveness."
The instruction given to the jury in the LeRay case to guide them
in determining whether the umbrella filter was defectively designed was:
"A product is defective or unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable
seller would not sell the product if he knew the risks involved or if the
risks are greater than a reasonable buyer would expect." '5 4 This instruc-
tion is nothing more than a mixture of the knowledgeable-seller test"
and the consumer-expectation test, and it provides absolutely no guidance
for the jury's decision-making process. The consumer-expectation test
presents much difficulty for the fact-finder attempting to decide if a
product is defective because in application, it is not clear whether the
ordinary consumer possessing ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity is a hypothetically reasonable man or the individual plaintiff in
the action at bar. The problem can best be illustrated by the case of
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.5 6 in which an experienced boater was thrown
overboard and drowned. Plaintiff, decedent's wife, alleged that the boat
was defective because the boat failed to have a kill switch which would
have cut the motor off when the decedent was ejected. The court,
purporting to use an objective consumer-expectation test by declaring
that for the product to be defective it must be dangerous beyond the
contemplation of the ordinary consumer, 7 based its decision on the
special knowledge of plaintiff's decedent as an experienced boater: "It
is common knowledge that a normal risk of boating is that of being
thrown overboard. While the test set out ... is an objective one and
knowledge to the community must be attributed to [plaintiff's decedent],
there can nevertheless be no question of his awareness of this risk." 8
The court purported to use an objective standard, but it then imputed
53. Many eminent scholars have also advocated the use of the risk-utility balancing
approach in conscious design cases. See Wade, supra note 5, at 837; Prosser, supra note
10, at 669; see also Keeton, Products Liability and The Meaning of Defect, 8 St. Mary's
L.J. 30 (1973).
54. 444 So. 2d at 1254.
55. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974),
defines the knowledgeable seller test as follows: "A dangerously defective article would
be one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce, if he had
knowledge of its harmful character." The knowledge of the dangerous condition is imputed
to the seller. Because the Louisiana courts have not applied this test and because it
produces results similar to those resulting from the consumer-expectations test, this article
will not analyze the knowledgeable seller test. The court in Phillips stated that "the two
standards are the same because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product
which a reasonable consumer believes he is buying." 269 Or. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037.
56. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
57. Id. at 470, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
58. Id. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 681'82.
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the decedent's specialized knowledge of boating to the ordinary consumer
in order to relieve the defendant of liability. Arguably, under this
subjective analysis the design may have been unreasonably dangerous
and the defendant may have been found liable had the decedent been
a less-experienced boater." This would create an unjust result in that
the design would be unreasonably dangerous to one plaintiff yet not
another.
It has also been argued that, even with a completely objective analysis
of the ordinary consumer, the consumer-expectation test is nothing more
than an updated version of the patent-danger rule.6° Many courts have
criticized the patent-danger rule as unjustly denying recovery to injured
plaintiffs and relieving manufacturers of their duty to design safe prod-
ucts. 61 Arguably, a reasonable consumer would expect that a product
with an apparent and obviously dangerous characteristic may be harmful.
Thus, under the consumer-expectation test, an injured plaintiff could
never recover from a defendant manufacturer for harm suffered as a
result of an apparent or obvious danger even if the product could have
been designed in a safer fashion, without great expense and decrease in
utility. In this instance the consumer-expectation test fails to provide
the manufacturer with any incentive to design safer products because
the manufacturer knows he can escape liability for defective design if
the danger is obvious.
Another problem is the opposite of that presented by the patent-
danger rule. A product considered unreasonably dangerous under the
consumer-expectation test would not necessarily be considered unrea-
sonably dangerous under the risk-utility balancing approach. Some prod-
ucts may be deemed unreasonably dangerous because few people are
victimized by unknowable or undiscoverable side effects. 62 From the
consumer's viewpoint the product is expected to be perfect. If something
goes wrong and someone is injured, it is easy to argue that the product
was dangerous beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer despite
the high utility of the product. This problem is analogous to the situation
in DeBattista in that a transfusion of blood has a high utility because
it is a lifesaver even though the undiscoverable risk of hepatitis is present.
Using the consumer-expectation test, it may be said that the consumer
does not expect to contract hepatitis, and therefore, that the blood is
59. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence (to
Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 612-13 (1980).
60. See Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 1303, 1304 (1974).
61. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398
(1970); Marshall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability
for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (1973); see also Byrns v.
Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.
2d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
62. Prosser, supra note 10, at 698-99.
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unreasonably dangerous, but if the utility of the blood is weighed against
the risk of becoming infected with hepatitis, the blood may not be
unreasonably dangerous or defective.
The consumer-expectation test presents another problem that limits
its feasibility in deciding defective design cases. How does a jury know
what a reasonable consumer expects in a certain product?63 How does
a jury know what the expectations of a reasonable consumer would be
toward a product with a complicated technical design? The question can
be raised whether expert testimony can be introduced to prove a rea-
sonable consumer's expectations. If this evidence is not allowed, then
is the jury limited to considering the views of a hypothetical reasonable
man?" In all probability, the jurors will make a visceral decision. The
jury will probably use some vague common-sense notion of what a
reasonable consumer would expect in the way of safety. 65 This increases
the chance of verdicts based on emotion rather than on reason and
evidence. Jurors may tend to vote with their emotions out of sympathy
to a badly injured plaintiff and against products they do not favor. It
should be remembered that the term "defect" used in the design-defect
context does not have the same meaning as in its ordinary context.
Webster's defines "defect" as "a fault or flaw, and irregularity."6 A
jury instruction requiring jurors to decide whether a product has a defect
without defining "defect" in a .particular context is useless. In a design
defect case, the fact-finder is trying to find an irregularity in the product
with no example of a regular product. Jurors in a design case, unlike
a manufacturing defect case, have nothing with which to compare the
injuring product. The balancing factors give the fact-finders some neutral
guidelines to aid them in determining what constitutes a defect in the
design context. However, it is difficult for a juror, who is himself a
consumer, to know what a reasonable person should expect from a
technologically complex product.
The determination of a defective or unreasonably dangerous design
is much more complicated than the determination of whether or not a
product is defectively manufactured. Without proper guidance as to what
"defect" or "unreasonably dangerous" means in this special context,
the fact-finder cannot be expected to pass judgement on the design safety
of a product. Although it is not error-free, the risk-utility balancing
approach is the best way to provide the fact-finder with this guidance.
In this context the product is defective if the magnitude of the risks
63. Id. at 699; Wade, supra note 5, at 829; Rheingold, What are the Consumer's
"Reasonable Expectations?", 22 Bus. Law. 589 (1967).
64. See O'Donnell & Thomas, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem
of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, J. Prods. Liab. 185, 199 (1982).
65. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rev. 803, 823 (1976).
66. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 591 (1976).
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outweighs the utility of the product. 67 Reasonable care is not a defense
since the manufacturer is presumed to know the dangerous condition
of the product. 68 This balancing process guides the fact-finder by helping
him to understand the conflicting interests which the product's designers
were required to "trade off" in deciding on things such as "safety,
cost, durability, weight, comfort, aesthetics and function." Emphasis on
the balancing factors also helps to insure that the fact-finder will base
his decision on neutral factors and on the evidence rather than on
emotional grounds. 69
The role of the fact-finder in a design case is similar to that of a
legislator who is called upon to decide whether to vote for proposed
legislation. The legislator must balance the desires of his constituents
on both sides and decide which vote to cast, based upon what he thinks
would be in the best interest of those he represents. Similarly, the juror
in a design case must decide the level of safety society will accept in
a technically designed product. This must be determined in part by the
cost of this safety to society in general. Sometimes a poll can tell the
legislator what society demands and he can thereby ascertain what his
constituents expect. A jury does not have this advantage. A jury has
no way of knowing what other consumers would expect from product.
Therefore, by weighing the risks of a product against its utility in society,
the fact-finder can get a better idea of.what safety level society should
demand in certain products.
The LeRay court should not have rejected the risk-utility balancing
approach in design defect cases. Not only does the court cite weak
authority for the proposition that Louisiana no longer uses the balancing
approach, it is clear that other Louisiana courts still use the balancing
approach in design cases. 70 Further support for its use can be found in
the Entrevia court's use of this approach in an article 2317 case, since
such a case is similar to a design case.
In light of the complex designs of today's products and the inad-
equacies of the consumer expectation test in the design area, it is hoped
that other courts in Louisiana will not follow LeRay and will continue
to realize that the risk-utility balancing process is the proper method to
determine a defective design.
Jeff Tillery
67. Prosser, supra note 10, at 699.
68. Wade, supra note 5, at 830.
69. See Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1146.
70. Hunt v. City Stores, 387 So. 2d at 585.
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